Rationalist Foundations and the Science of Force by Stan, Marius
To appear in: 
Brandon Look and Frederick Beiser (eds.) 
The Oxford Handbook of German 18th-Century Philosophy 
CUP, 2016. 
 
 
 
Rationalist Foundations and the Science of Force 
 
Marius Stan 
 
 
This chapter is a new account of natural philosophy in post-Leibnizian Prus-
sia. Because mechanics was then natural science par excellence and my space 
here is limited, I restrict my view to foundations for mechanics from 1716 to 
1786. Three conclusions emerge. First, mechanics in Enlightenment Prussia 
is far from Newtonian. Rather, its structure and basis are greatly fluid, and 
take decades to crystallize into three distinct paradigms; just one of them is 
meaningfully Newtonian. Second, Leibniz turns out to have influenced natu-
ral philosophy to a degree so far unappreciated. Third, in this age theoretical 
mechanics and its philosophy begin to drift apart, perhaps irretrievably.  
I begin by presenting three views then dominant on the basic unit of 
matter (§ 1). Next, I explain the basic dynamical laws aiming then to unify 
mechanical phenomena (§ 2). Lastly, I examine some opposing views on in-
ertial structure for Enlightenment dynamics in Prussia (§ 3).  
The modern category ‘German’ is inapplicable to my area and cast of 
characters. They were not German citizens, nor did they publish just in 
German; some did not even speak it much.1 Thus in selecting them I had to 
make a judgment call. I will examine here two philosophers, Wolff and Kant. 
The former deserves inclusion for his vast, original synthesis and his influ-
ence over a sizeable group of followers; the latter needs no justification. Both 
                                                     
1 From a 1738 letter by Daniel Bernoulli for Euler, both Swiss: “Eben lese ich in dem Journal 
que Mess. Krafft et Delisle font presque tous les jours des expériences devant S[a] M[ajesté] 
I[mpériale]…. Vor ein Paar Tagen habe ich von dem Hr. König … ein programma gehalten, 
darin er den Geometris sieben problemata intra sex mensium spatium zu solviren proponirt. 
Die problemata sind profundae indaginis, und hat der Autor nicht wenig praestirt, wenn er sie 
alle recht solvirt.”—Fuss 1843: 425f.  
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were fairly conversant with the exact science of their time, though as me-
chanics progresses Kant’s grasp of it begins to lag behind.2 Also, I present 
here some crucial contributions by Euler and Lagrange. Consecutively, each 
was for some two decades the supreme geometer at the Royal Academy of 
Sciences in Berlin. The Swiss developed much of what we know as Newton-
Euler dynamics. Lagrange, who succeeded Euler after he moved to St Pe-
tersburg in 1764, used his long research sojourn in Berlin to prepare his 1788 
masterpiece Méchanique analitique, the first non-Newtonian comprehensive 
theory of mechanics.  
I limit my exposition to Prussia and its environs. Covering the western 
German states would take up space that I do not have here. And, I ignore 
here entirely the vis viva controversy. It has been over-studied, to the lamen-
table neglect of other, more important topics and results. Instead, and in the 
spirit of this publication, I will suggest and defend new lines of inquiry, by 
way of an opinionated introduction to my topic. 
The upshot of my study is threefold. It should make us wary of assimilat-
ing 18th-century German natural philosophy with ‘Newtonian science.’ It 
justifies a call to arms: let us give more, careful attention to Leibniz’s legacy 
for dynamics in the Age of Reason. Lastly, it makes a case for a new reading 
of Kant’s natural philosophy: we ought to contextualize it to the science of 
his time rather than—as tradition has long had it—to Newton’s Principia, a 
work that precedes it by about a century.     
 
Ontologies for mechanics 
In the 17th century an ambitious program, the mechanical philosophy, had 
set out to ground all science in basic facts about matter and motion, by ex-
planatory reduction. Though Leibniz soon claimed that ‘force’ is more basic 
than extension and impenetrability—the mechanists’ universal features of 
body—even he conceded that, once a mechanics has been articulated, all 
else must be reduced to it, as matter in motion.3 Wolff and Kant, who fol-
                                                     
2 I cite Kant by volume and page number in Kant 1902-. Henceforth, ‘1’ refers to Kant 1992, 
and ‘4’ to Kant 2004. I mention his Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science simply as ‘Foun-
dations.’ Unless otherwise noted, all translations are mine.   
3 Hertz too affirmed that ideal (1899: xxi): “All physicists agree that the problem of physics 
consists in tracing the phenomena of nature back to the simple laws of mechanics.”  
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lowed him broadly in his ‘dynamistic’ account of matter, also took this pro-
gram for granted: 
 
all corporeal action is from motion….  I acknowledge that all other phenomena 
of matter can be explained in terms of local motion. ([Leibniz] 1695: 145ff) 
The entire visible world is a machine..., a compound in which changes to its 
composition or structure always follow the rules of motion. (Wolff 1737: 66f.)  
The basic determination of something that is to be object of the outer senses had 
to be motion…., and so natural science, therefore, is either a pure or applied 
doctrine of motion. (Kant 4:477) 
 
Implicit in the program was a shared assumption, which Enlightenment me-
chanics ultimately subverts.  It was the thought that, when spelled out care-
fully, both ‘matter’ and ‘motion’ will be univocal. Namely, the unit of matter, 
whatever its final profile, will have a single kinematic structure and basic be-
havior, not multiple. However, as mechanics grew and philosophy strove to 
give it an ontology, ‘matter’ and ‘motion’ came to denote not one but three, 
wholly distinct species. I will put the point in modern terms, to see it clearly, 
and then illustrate it with examples from the time and place of my topic.  
From Descartes onward, mesoscopic bodies were supposedly made up 
from components at subvisible scales, viz. the unit of matter. (Many called it 
a ‘corpuscle’ then.) Speaking anachronistically, these units come in three 
kinds: the mass point, the rigid body, and the deformable continuum. Now, 
these kinds are irreducibly distinct. In the first, mass is located at a point; in 
the other two, it is distributed over a volume, finite or infinitesimal, respec-
tively. ‘Motion’ too has essentially different senses for these three kinds. A 
mass point can only translate, along the three direction of Cartesian space. In 
contrast, a rigid body can translate and rotate, around internal axes. And, a 
volume element (in a deformable continuum) can translate, rotate and de-
form.4 Impenetrability is radically unlike for these ultimate objects. Mass 
points: no two points can overlap, or become superimposed. Deformable 
continua: they can overlap at a point, line or area (viz. their contact surface) 
but not over a finite volume. Rigid bodies: no overlap by a finite volume; and 
no volume previously taken up by one can become occupied by another. (Sed 
                                                     
4 In our terms, a mass point has three degrees of freedom, a rigid body has six, and a deforma-
ble continuum has an infinity.  
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contra, a deformable continuous body can be compressed, or made to yield 
some of its ‘space’ to another body.)  
Moreover, these units interact with their own kind and make up bodies 
in distinct, specific ways. Mass points exert only action at a distance—
repulsion and attraction.5 In this ontology, a body is a lattice of them in equi-
librium configurations, i.e. at relative positions where their mutual forces 
balance each other. In turn, microscopic rigids exert body forces, like gravi-
ty; and also contact forces and torques.6 They connect to form visible bodies 
either by internal pins and joints; or by external force closure, such as the 
pressure of an ambient fluid (traditionally, some imponderable, e.g. the 
ether). Lastly, deformable continuous bodies come pre-constituted. Volume 
elements dV, the unit of matter in continuum mechanics, are just potential 
parts. Each is the limit to which an ‘Euler cut,’ or arbitrary finite volume V 
in the body, shrinks. Unlike rigid bodies, deformables bear stresses, i.e. inter-
nal contact forces (between parts).  
These basic objects differ radically in all relevant respects. (i) Matter: 
mass points are discrete and zero-sized, rigid bodies and deformables are 
finite continua. (ii) Motion: deformation is meaningless for a rigid or a mass 
point. Spin is meaningless for mass points, but well-defined for the other two 
basic objects. (iii) Force too: internal stresses are meaningless for rigid bod-
ies; and contact forces and torques are meaningless for mass points. And so, 
there is no prospect of reducing two of them to the third.     
The better thinkers in our group are very much sensitive to these differ-
ences. For instance, Kant knows to distinguish “physical contact,” or exer-
cise of repulsive force, from “mathematical contact,” i.e. kinematic overlap; 
“penetrating” from “surface” actions, i.e. body forces from contact forces; 
and “relative” from “absolute” impenetrability, viz. resistance to compres-
sion from rigidity. Euler seems even more acutely aware of the mathematical 
and physical differences between these basic entities.7 
                                                     
5 In their case, ‘contact action’ is really a misnomer: just convenient shorthand for short-range 
repulsive acceleration.  
6 In continuum mechanics, a body force is one that acts directly on any point inside an ex-
tended body. (For instance, gravity or electromagnetism.) A contact force acts on the bound-
ary of that body, thus indirectly—through the transmission of stress—on any point within it.  
7 E.g., he writes M, a finite number, for the mass element when he treats a body as a set of 
mass points; and dM when he regards the body as continuous; cf. Euler 1765b versus 1752. 
Likewise, he knows that the basic laws of rigid bodies or of elastic solids cannot be derived 
from the laws governing mass points; cf. Euler 1771 and 1776.    
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Foundations.   All three ontological units are the explicit object of En-
lightenment natural philosophy. Prussia was well at the forefront, where phi-
losophers called these units respectively ‘physical monad,’ ‘hard body,’ and 
‘infinitely divisible matter.’ Let us survey the academics first. Some have 
Boscovich be the author of modern mass points, but this entity really has two 
fathers. Kant in the 1750s espoused it too, though not without some ambiva-
lence. In Physical Monadology, he mixed uneasily two pictures of matter. 
When properly purified, one of them—the official view, advocated early in 
the essay—is a doctrine of mass points:8 
 
Elements fill their determinate space by a certain activity that prevents other 
bodies from penetrating it…. The force of impenetrability is a repulsive force.   
In addition to the force of impenetrability, every element needs another force, 
that of attraction….  
There must be some point on the diameter where attraction and repulsion are 
equal. This point will determine the limit of impenetrability and the orbit of ex-
ternal contact; that is to say, it will determine the volume.  
The force of inertia of a body (which is called its mass) is the sum of the forces 
of inertia of all the elements of which it is composed. (1:482, 484, 485) 
 
Thus, a physical monad, or Kantian ‘element,’ is inert, acts only by central 
forces (of repulsion and attraction), its mass is concentrated at a point, and 
its volume is really just an acceleration field.  
As to the deformable continuum, it had long been Leibniz’s official theo-
ry of matter (at least in public, in his later years). Wolff too takes bodies to 
be continuous, which he supports by a variety of considerations. One is a 
direct argument. A body is an “aggregate of elements,” and material aggre-
gates “are extended,” and extended matter is continuous (1737: 169ff). Un-
fortunately, little is clear about the structure of “elements,” the constituents 
of Wolffian bodies.9 Each is endowed with two (purely qualitative, but not 
mentalistic) forces, “active” and “passive.” Elements interact, but that mech-
anism is mysterious. Wolff infers that they must be partless and indivisible, 
for they are the simples that ground material composites (146). As they can-
                                                     
8 Many have long credited Kant’s essay with a single, mass-point view; Holden 2004 is para-
digmatic. Smith 2013 argues conclusively that the Physical Monadology oscillates between two 
theories of matter, not one. For the context of Kant’s paper, see Leduc (forthcoming).   
9 He also called them, before Kant, ‘physical monads,’ to signal discreetly his departure from 
Leibniz. Cf. Wolff 1737: 148. Watkins 2006 is an acute discussion of how Wolff differs from 
Leibniz in regard to metaphysical ‘simples.’  
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not be mass points, we might be tempted to assimilate them with volume 
elements dV, the element of integration in continuum mechanics. However, 
this is all conjectural; Wolff writes well before Cauchy clarified the physical 
continuum, so his account perforce is fuzzy. Eventually, he claims that ele-
ments stand in the relation ‘outside each other,’ extra se invicem, and thereby 
can make up continuous bodies by “aggregation,” an operation left unex-
plained. This vexed problem soon spawned a family of post-Leibnizian mon-
adologies, which then created its own opposition.10  
Wolff hoped to draw more support for his ontology of matter from objec-
tions to competing views. The paradigmatic early-modern rigid body was 
the ‘hard’ atom, and he rejects it out of hand. Though tiny, atoms are ex-
tended, and so they have shapes. But, atomic shape “lacks a sufficient reason 
why it inheres in its subject,” and thus it is an “occult quality,” hence natural 
philosophy must banish rigid atoms (1737: 149). As for mass points, Wolff 
never bothered to dismiss them in writing. Coached by Leibniz, he always 
reviled actio in distans, and that is the only type of causal power they have. 
Had he lived to hear about young Kant’s physical monads, he would have 
denounced them as an absurd monstrosity.11  
An unadulterated view of matter as continuous at all scales is on display 
in Kant’s Foundations of 1786: “Matter is divisible to infinity, and, in fact, 
into parts such that each is matter in turn” (4:503). The view is sophisticated 
too, not just pure. Like modern continuum mechanics, Kant lets matter be 
governed by Conservation of Mass, which he derives from his First Analogy. 
He has a good grasp of mass density in a continuum. And, he endows matter 
with “penetrating” and “surface” actions, i.e. body forces and contact forc-
es.12 In one respect, he stands alone in his age: his ‘penetrating’ force (of at-
traction) is direct action at a distance, which he always defended valiantly 
from common objections. Then, like his predecessors, Kant too moves to 
                                                     
10 E.g., G. Ploucquet, who started out with monads, strove to understand how they make up a 
continuum, and gave up on them as “chimeras, whose nothingness is sufficiently proven” 
(1753:355). Another, merciless opponent was Euler 1746b. In private, these debates could get 
rather acrimonious; see Ostertag 1910: 50-150. Keen accounts of the warring positions is De 
Risi (2007: 301-14) and Leduc 2015.      
11 I examine Wolff’s arguments against action-at-a-distance, and Leibniz’s influence on him, 
in my (forthcoming b).  
12 See 4:541f and 516. For thorough discussion, see Friedman 2013. Still, Kant’s actuality has 
limits. He could never bring himself to recognize the existence of shear forces in his continu-
um. Cf. Wilson (2013: 89) and Stan (2014: 435ff).  
 7
delegitimize rigid bodies, though by a new argument. And, he bids good-bye 
to the mass points he used to advocate (4:502, 504f).13 Or so he says. Unwit-
tingly, he had already taken it back, in his foundations of kinematics: 
 
Since in phoronomy nothing is to be at issue except motion, no other property is 
here ascribed to the subject of motion, namely, matter, aside from movability. It 
can itself so far, therefore, also be considered as a point, and one abstracts in 
phoronomy from all inner constitution…. If the expression “body” should never-
theless sometimes be used here, this is only to anticipate to some extent the appli-
cation of the principles of phoronomy to the more determinate concepts of matter 
that are still to follow. (4: 480; my italics) 
      
In effect, Kant here quietly has mechanics adopt a mass-point view, despite 
his own official doctrine that matter is continuous. He has just argued for 
treating an extended body as a point-sized entity, which he then endows with 
mass. Ultimately, this reverberates through his entire grounding of mechan-
ics, with adverse effects (Stan 2014).  
Though everyone—Leibniz, Johann Bernoulli, Wolff and Kant—
rejected rigid bodies emphatically, it is doubtful that any professional philos-
opher in Prussia endorsed this ontology. Lambert might fit the bill, but he 
was no mainstream figure in academia. Kant in Foundations suggests, darkly, 
that it was the default matter theory of the “mathematical investigators of 
nature,” and yet he leaves them unnamed. Were they all reproving a domes-
tic straw man? Or were their attacks directed abroad?  
 Before we move on, note how little Newtonian this all is. Newton’s pre-
ferred ontology of matter was rigid atoms and empty space; his many follow-
ers in 18th-century Britain favored it too (Heimann & McGuire 1971). And 
yet, if there is one thing that unites Leibniz, Wolff and Kant, it is their stark 
rejection of rigid matter and the void.   
Superstructure.   As an edifying sequel, let us now turn to some local 
mécaniciens. They articulated exactly the respective mechanical theory of 
each of the three basic entities above. It is thanks to their researches that the 
fundamental differences between these objects become clear. Still, I do not 
mean to imply that they posited any of these objects as ontologically basic. If 
they had any such commitment, it is quite hard to discern.  
                                                     
13 For a lucid explanation of both points, see Friedman 2013.  
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Euler is their standard bearer, but also the most confounding figure. He 
contributed equally to the mechanics of all three objects above. The mass 
point—single and free, or kinematically unconstrained—is the main topic of 
his youthful Mechanica of 1736. However, much in it was just a unification of 
earlier results in 1-particle dynamics by Newton and Jakob Hermann. In the 
1740s, he started breaking new ground, by deriving equations of motion for 
systems of mass points; and for a constrained mass point.14 That was his master-
ful De motu corporum in superficiebus mobilibus, where he determined the trajec-
tory of a mass point forced to move on rigid surfaces, whether fixed or freely 
movable (Euler 1746). 
As to rigid-body dynamics, Euler created it more or less single-
handedly.15 His decisive breakthrough came in 1750, with Découverte d’un 
nouveau principe de Mécanique, whose significance is comparable to Newton’s 
book. There, Euler obtained equations of motion for a rigid body moving 
around a fixed point under external forces. A few years later, he had another 
insight (Euler 1765a). In Recherches sur la connoissance mécanique des corps, he 
explained that, in addition to mass, or resistance to translation, matter has 
another basic property. It is the moment of inertia, i.e. resistance to rotation 
around some instantaneous axis. He unified all his results on this fundamen-
tal object in Theoria motus corporum solidorum (1765b). His last breakthrough 
was in Formulae generales pro translatione quacumque corporum rigidorum. There, 
he had a deep kinematic insight: any rigid transplacement—the most general 
sense of motion for a rigid body—is equivalent to a translation and a finite 
rotation (Euler 1776b). He was inspired to take up this problem by La-
grange, who at Berlin had handled this topic in his (1773). Like d’Alembert 
before them in France, they studied rigid motion so at to extend Newton’s 
program in celestial mechanics. The Briton in 1687 had modeled the planets 
as particles. But, that made it impossible to treat the gravitational phenomena 
they exhibit as extended bodies: precession, nutation, libration, and tidal lock-
                                                     
14 Hepburn 2007 and (forthcoming) study Euler’s early dynamics in the context of early 18th-
century natural philosophy. Stan (forthcoming b) explains Euler’s complicated relation to 
Newton, and his creation of rigid dynamics.  
15 There was research on rigid-body motion before Euler, but it had a severe limitation. Lack-
ing a proper kinematics and sufficient dynamical laws, theorists were confined to studying the 
motion of just one, representative point in the body—the so-called ‘center of oscillation.’ A 
survey of results is Vilain 2000.  
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ing.16 To explain these, Euler and Lagrange had to model a planet as a rigid 
body.   
In regard to the mechanics of continuous bodies, here too Euler created 
large swathes of it. (D’Alembert too, in France.) He found the equilibrium 
conditions for a thin rod (the elastica), in an appendix to a pioneering tract 
on variational methods (Euler 1744). In the 1750s, he unified and general-
ized the statics and dynamics of ‘Newtonian’ inviscid fluids in laminar and 
vortex flows. As part of that, he articulated the concept of internal pressure 
in a continuous fluid (Darrigol & Frisch 2008). Another key result was his 
memoir Principes généraux du mouvement des fluides, the birth of ‘Euler’s equa-
tions’ for compressible flow (1757). In a letter to Lagrange, he devised what 
we call the ‘Lagrangian’ description of motion for a continuum (1762). The 
deep dynamical insight he obtained in Découverte above slowly led him down 
the path to equations of motion for manageable, lower-dimensional continua: 
the elastica and the thin plate, or lamina (1771, 1776a).17 The former paper 
is important because Euler shows there for the first time how to compute the 
shear stress in a continuum—a type of force that has no meaning or reality in 
rigid bodies or mass points (1771: 384).   
Fracture.   As the 1780s draw to an end, the growth of mechanics re-
veals, somewhat ex post facto, a facet that should have unsettled our philoso-
phers, had they kept up with it. Throughout the century, mechanical theory 
strove to become general: to explain the full range of mechanical phenomena 
known then, by deriving equations of motion for them. But, it turned out, 
that task eventually required it to resort to three kinds of building blocks for 
modeling bodies: the mass point, the rigid body, and the deformable contin-
uum. As I have explained, these objects are deeply unlike and mutually irre-
ducible. Thus mechanics had to give up on the philosophers’ dream to an-
chor it in a single, monolithic base ontology.   
Euler and Lagrange, it appears, did not miss that. They saw, more clear-
ly than the philosophers, that in mechanics the need for generality can trump 
ontological unity. So, the theorists turned understandably quietist about the 
                                                     
16 These are all phenomena associated with a planet’s axis of rotation and its angular velocity 
about it. But, a mass point has no such axis.  
17 Due to a lack of adequate kinematics, three-dimensional elastic solids remained in good 
part out of his reach. They first get treated in post-Napoleonic French mechanics, chiefly by 
Cauchy, Poisson, Navier and Saint-Venant.  
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ultimate constitution of body.18 Philosophers, in contrast, rushed in to fill 
that silence. As we have seen, they sought to avoid ontology fracture by a 
dual strategy. First, they gave a priori arguments for a preferred unit of mat-
ter; witness Wolff’s and Kant’s proofs that body is a physical continuum. 
Second, they tried to rule out, again on a priori grounds, competitor ontolo-
gies—rigid bodies and mass points. However, they seem to have missed that, 
by keeping ontology unified, they fail to give a sufficient foundation for me-
chanics. Clinging to one picture of matter at all costs will fail to yield a me-
chanics demonstrably general.     
Thus, by the last third of the century, mechanics had fractured ontology. 
The early modern hope for a single, univocal material basis yields to a pro-
tracted struggle for foundational supremacy that extends well into the Spät-
klassik, enmeshing Lord Kelvin and Helmholtz, Duhem and Mach, Hertz 
and Hilbert. In deep, subtle exchanges, these figures debated whether me-
chanics ultimately rests on discrete or continuous matter, contact forces or 
distance actions, bodies with finite or infinite degrees of freedom. In retro-
spect, we see that they continued a dialog that began with Wolff and Kant, 
d’Alembert and Euler, Boscovich and Lagrange.  
 
Dynamical laws 
Primed by Kuhnian intuitions about paradigms, we might expect that, after 
Newton’s Principia came out, its three mechanical principles became the laws 
of motion for everyone, our protagonists included. Not long ago, Eric Wat-
kins discovered this to be a mistake. The canonical laws of motion in aca-
demic Prussia differed significantly—in content and intent—from Newton’s 
principles. Subsequently, others proved that these schools also refused to 
embrace the Briton’s understanding of inertia, force and interaction. To-
gether, these findings point to an unexpected conclusion: in Prussian univer-
sities before the late 1750s, Newton’s own conceptual basis for mechanics is 
mostly invisible. Instead, local figures were in thrall to a foundational pro-
gram bequeathed by Leibniz.19 Wolff and his followers carried it out, and it 
left deep marks on Kant’s thinking too. I will make that clear as I explain 
                                                     
18 Despite his teachings in Letters to a German Princess, it is unclear what Euler’s considered 
ontology of matter was. I explore this question in my (forthcoming a).  
19 This is the result of Watkins (1997; 1998) and Stan (2012; forthcoming b).  
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another way in which natural philosophy falls apart at that time. Like the 
breakup I examined in Section I, it too ends in fracture: between philosophi-
cal reflection and scientific theory.  
The distant source of that is Descartes. Recall his program in Principia 
Philosophiae of using ‘laws of motion’ to ground ‘rules’ of motion.20 Wolff 
keeps this Cartesian duality and the program it underwrote:  
 
The general principles of the rules of motion are called laws of motion.…  Implicit 
in the rules of motion there are general principles, from which we can derive 
these rules…. Mathematicians assume these laws without proof; but it behooves 
the Metaphysician to demonstrate them. Hence we deem it our business to es-
tablish them here. (Wolff 1737: 228) 
 
Now, there was a deep source of tension in Descartes’ project. To secure 
absolute certainty for mechanics, he let it flow—by deductive argument—
from indubitable facts about God and the essence of matter, through the laws 
of motion, to the rules. But, he did not foresee that the final list of ‘rules of 
motion’ might in the end be longer than the seven rules he had on record. 
Thus, conflict can ensue: the full list of rules, or equations of motion, might 
need for their derivation a wholly different set of dynamical laws than Des-
cartes’ three principles. Critically, these laws might be impossible to anchor 
by any a priori argument in metaphysical resources.  
Founders.   Nearly a century after him, Wolff too was oblivious to this 
danger. To make good on his promise above, he gave two laws of motion, 
grounded in metaphysics: a Law of Inertia, and a Law of Action and Reac-
tion (1737: 229, 252). Wolff insisted that these principles are necessary, and 
so he tried to produce a priori evidence for their truth. To that end, he in-
vented a confirmation strategy that would loom large in the Enlightenment.21 
It is a mixture of metaphysics of body, conceptual analysis, and the Principle 
of Sufficient Reason, PSR.22    
                                                     
20 The laws were basic principles of 1-body motion and interaction; the rules, kinematic pre-
dictions of outcome in 2-body collision—ancestors of equations of motion. 
21 Even his philosophical opponents adopted it. For instance, d’Alembert, whose dynamics 
rests on three explanatory principles, or ‘laws of motion,’ and a general heuristic, nowadays 
called ‘d’Alembert’s Principle.’ Like Wolff, d’Alembert grounds his laws in conceptual analy-
sis and the PSR; cf. Firode 2001. Kant too succumbs to this Wolffian strategy, even in his 
Critical years; cf. Stan 2013.    
22 Quite unlike Leibniz, Wolff and argued that PSR was necessary—and so facts grounded in 
it are themselves necessary. A sharp account of Wolff’s grounding of PSR is Look 2011.  
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As illustration, consider his defense of his second law of motion. First, he 
analyzes the concept ‘interaction’ as denoting the encounter between an 
agent and a patient body. Then, from his ontology of body, he takes that 
there are active and passive forces. He assigns the former to agents and the 
latter to patient bodies. Next, he invokes PSR to infer, there is no sufficient 
reason why an agent should exert more active force (needed to break the 
patient’s resistance) than the latter puts up passive force to oppose the agent. 
So, he concludes, in any interaction the active force spent by the agent 
equals the passive force put up by the patient—no more, no less. This is his 
Law of Action and Reaction (234-8; 251-5). 
This seems broadly Newtonian, but that appearance misleads badly. 
Wolff’s dynamical laws, and the concepts behind them, differ sharply from 
Newton’s. In fact, we ought to wonder if they are at all compatible with the 
Principia. That book neither supports nor requires Wolff’s heterogeneous 
dualities agent vs. patient, active vs. passive force, and action vs. reaction. 
Newtonian action and reaction are homogeneous, not different in kind: both 
are vires impressae ruled by the Second Law—and Wolff lacks all that. Thus, 
Newtonianism is again conspicuously absent from his system. The reason, I 
show elsewhere, is that Wolff’s mechanical foundations really come from 
Leibniz. Jakob Hermann, another Leibnizian, likewise shaped his basic laws 
of dynamics, which never aimed to ground Newton’s theory (Stan, forth-
coming b). 
It is hard for us to grasp how influential Wolff and his views were then. 
Like much else he wrote, his doctrinaire natural philosophy swayed many in 
Germany: Thümmig, Gottsched, Winckler, Stiebritz, Baumeister, Burkhäu-
ser, Hausen, Kahle, Formey, and the compendious Hanov, who set out in 
the 1760s to rival his master in output. Many of them just paraphrase his 
physical teachings when they do not repeat them verbatim. Nowadays de-
servedly forgotten, their sheer number then made Wolff’s account into the 
received consensus, and made them a powerful presence.  
So powerful, in fact, that the young Kant began his New Theory of Motion 
in 1758 hoping the Wolffians would forgive his dissent from their dogmas 
(2:15). And yet, Kant does not write it to roll back Wolff’s foundations in 
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the name of Newton, as one would expect from a recent convert.23 Rather, 
he merely corrects that dogma, by subverting the Wolffian distinction 
agent/patient. Otherwise, he keeps an astonishing amount of their ultimately 
Leibnizian views. Like them, Kant thinks that the basic laws of motion are 
two (not three, as Newton had it); they are derivable a priori; impact is the 
paradigm of interaction, and is a mutual exercise of “force of motion,” a de-
scendant of Wolff’s vis motrix, not Newton’s vis impressa. Remarkably, these 
Leibniz-Wolffian commitments and agenda survive almost unscathed in 
Kant’s mature philosophy of physics.24    
 Builders.   While the philosophers aimed at absolute certainty, the theo-
rists’ driving force was the search for truly general laws of motion, i.e. proven 
to entail equations of motion for all types of bodies and mechanical systems. 
Despite our initial expectations, Newton and his contemporaries did not be-
queath such laws to the Enlightenment. And, this became quite clear before 
too long. Of the mechanical principles handed down by the Seventeenth 
Century, the young Euler says: 
 
These principles are of no use in the study of motion, unless the bodies are infin-
itesimally small, hence the size of a point—or at least we can regard them as such 
without much error: which happens when the direction of the soliciting power 
passes through the center of gravity…. But if it does not pass through that center, we 
cannot determine the entire effect of these powers. That is all the more so when 
the body to be moved is not free, viz. is constrained by some obstacle, depending 
on its structure. (Euler 1745, §17; my emphasis) 
 
In our terms, his complaint is that the laws of the late 1730s could not pre-
dict the motion of extended bodies and constrained systems—a very large 
class of behaviors, to be sure. That realization set off a quest for ostensibly 
general principles of mechanics. However, as Euler and his peers set out to 
uncover them, no one foresaw they would end up with not one but three dis-
tinct and independent sets of basic laws. This makes the foundations of me-
chanics ca. 1780 overdetermined, a situation that continues today.  
                                                     
23 Many take Kant’s Theory of Heavens (1755) to signal his move to Newtonianism. The truth is 
complicated, of course. Watkins 2013 untangles carefully the various (anti-)Newtonian 
strands in Kant’s thought at that time. Jauernig 2011 explains his stance toward the Wolffians 
beyond natural philosophy.   
24 For explanation and argument, see Stan 2013. Friedman 2013 also endorses these claims. 
These results ultimately vindicate the main insight of Watkins 1997.  
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The first general principle originated with Maupertuis, who found that 
when two bodies collide directly or balance each other on a lever, the inte-
gral ∫Mvds tends to a minimum.25 This was evidence for a new dynamical 
law, which he called the Principle of Least Action (1740, 1744). At Berlin, 
his colleague Euler extended the insight to the motion of a particle attracted 
by one or more central forces, in his Harmonie entre les principes généraux de 
repos et de mouvement de M. de Maupertuis (1753a). Euler then claimed optimis-
tically that, “with an easy and natural addition,” Maupertuis’ law “extends 
with the greatest success to the whole Science of motion” (1753b: 217).  
Still, it was no proof that the principle was demonstrably general. That 
breakthrough came from the young Lagrange, then an obscure adjunct pro-
fessor known outside Italy to no one but Euler. Though his feat happened at 
Turin, it earns mention here for developing results Lagrange had first had in 
a memoir (submitted to the Berlin Academy) that greatly impressed Euler, 
who brought Lagrange to Berlin, where he became the leading innovator in 
mechanics (Galletto 1991).  
What moved Euler to awe was Lagrange’s creation of a new mathemat-
ic, the calculus of variations. He then exported it to mechanics, in Application 
de la méthode précédente à la solution de différentes problèmes de dynamique of 
1762, which he started with a “General principle.” Let a set of masses M, 
M, etc. interacting by central forces cross the spaces s, s, etc. in a time t. Let 
u, u, etc. be their instantaneous velocities. “Then the formula M∫uds + 
M∫uds + M∫uds + etc. will always be a minimum or a maximum” (La-
grange 1762: 198). More exactly, Lagrange’s law says that the variation of a 
certain quantity, viz. the action integral, is null: 
 
[1]       Mvds = 0 
 
This is the Maupertuis-Euler Principle of Least Action, restated by Lagrange 
in variational terms. From it he derived equations of motion for a large class 
of mechanical setups, including systems of constrained particles, a gas, a flu-
id in laminar flow, and a rigid body. It was proof that his principle was a 
general law of dynamics.   
                                                     
25 For each body in the system, M is its mass, v the instantaneous velocity, ds the differential 
arc element of its trajectory. The integral is with respect to time.  
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The second principle was born abroad, though from a seed sown by Jo-
hann Bernoulli, a vocal Leibnizian. It was this: the virtual work of the ap-
plied forces on a system in equilibrium vanishes. His friend, Varignon, made 
it public and used it to outline a statics of rigid bodies, in Nouvelle Mécanique, 
ou Statique (1725: 176). Another seed was planted by d’Alembert in his great 
dynamical treatises of the 1740s. To find equations of motion for constrained 
systems, he reasoned as follows. The motions acquired in fact by the system 
do not coincide with the motions impressed on it by the external causes; 
some impressed motion is lost to the constraints.26 To find the acquired mo-
tions, i.e. the actual accelerations, d’Alembert proposed a heuristic: the ac-
quired motions, if their sign were reversed, would balance the impressed mo-
tions. That is, if all these motions were given to the dynamical system at is-
sue, it would be in equilibrium. At this point, it can be handled with the tools 
of statics.27  
It was the young Lagrange who unified the two insights above, into a 
principle he knew quite well to be general. His thought was this. Take the 
masses in a system, and multiply them by their respective actual accelera-
tions. Suppose that forces, equal to these products but opposite to them, acted 
on the system in addition to the real forces already acting on it. (This is La-
grange recasting d’Alembert’s idea in terms of forces, not ‘motions.’) Then 
the system would be in static equilibrium. Thereby, it comes under the juris-
diction of the Bernoulli-Varignon statical law above: the virtual work of all 
these forces is zero. We call it the Principle of Virtual Work: 
 
[2]   ∑ (Fi + Ji)  ri = 0 
 
To make a dynamical system reveal its equations of motion, Lagrange sub-
jects it to a twin Gedankenexperiment. In addition to the actual forces Fi acting 
on it, he introduces a set of fictive forces Ji such that they balance the com-
bined Fi. With the system now reduced (in thought) to rest, he gives each 
part (again in thought) a virtual displacement ri compatible with the con-
                                                     
26 Think of a body on an inclined plane. Part of the acceleration of gravity—viz. the compo-
nent normal to the plane—is never acquired actually by the body.  
27 Admittedly, this is rather opaque. Explaining it sufficiently requires much more space than 
I have here. A lucid account of d’Alembert’s idea is Fraser 1985; clear expositions of its mod-
ern role are Duhem 1903 and Hamel 1949.   
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straints. His principle is that Fi and Ji are such that their net mechanical 
work along these displacements is null. From this, he derived a “general 
formula containing the solution to all the problems on the motion of bodies,” 
i.e. the so-called ‘Lagrangian’ equation of motion28 (1878[1763]: 12).  
Lagrange first applied and advertised this law in Recherches sur la libration 
de la lune, 1763. Soon after that he moved to Berlin, where he spent twenty 
years figuring out how to extend his law to all of mechanics. That compre-
hensive effort produced his Méchanique analitique, in which he called his law 
the “General Principle of Virtual Velocities.” Though the work came out in 
France, it soon appeared in German as well (Lagrange 1797). Its principle 
became the norm for some key German figures too; e.g. Gauss in his work 
on hydrostatics (1830). Elsewhere, it was the basic dynamical law for much 
of the next century (Capecchi 2012).                  
The third general principle was twofold. Because of its explanatory pow-
er, we know it now as Euler’s Laws of Motion (Truesdell 1991). However, 
unlike Lagrange’s two consecutive achievements above, Euler did not write 
a comprehensive treatise to demonstrate the range of his two laws. Rather, 
he piecewise proved that they are general (Stan, forthcoming a). The first 
law by itself enabled him to determine the motion of a rigid body around a 
fixed point (1752); the linear flow of inviscid fluids (1757); and later, mass 
points with constraints (Euler 1781; 1783).  However, as he expanded his 
scope, Euler came to realize that his First Law was generally not enough to 
determine completely the mechanical behavior of extended bodies. Rather, a 
second basic law is needed, analogous to the first but logically independent 
from it. This insight emerges clearly in Euler’s later work in elasticity, rigid-
body dynamics, and constrained motion (1771, 1776b, 1781). There, he al-
ways starts “from first principles,” by setting down two laws: 
 
[3a]     f = ma  
 
[3b]     h = i 
 
The equation of motion for the particular system at issue follows in every 
case from them.  If Euler’s two laws above look Newtonian, it is because 
                                                     
28 To learn how he did that, see Fraser 1983 and Barroso Filho 1994.  
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they generalize Newton’s Lex Secunda. The laws assert that there are two 
fundamental kinds of mechanical agencies and effects. The first is forces, 
which impress linear accelerations; the second is torques, or causes of angu-
lar acceleration (around some instantaneous axis of rotation). Bodies resist 
the first in proportion to their mass, the second in proportion to their mo-
ment of inertia.  
Against this backdrop, it may seem as if the passage of time takes me-
chanics toward its broadly Newtonian version we learn early in college. We 
should resist that impression; it is a side effect of my having to end my ac-
count with the 1780s. In the evolution of mechanics, that is an artificial cut-
off point. From that perspective, Newton-Euler dynamics is the minority 
view in the two centuries after the Principia. Lagrange’s Principle of Virtual 
Work becomes the basic law in French mechanics for well over half a centu-
ry after his move to Paris in 1783. In Britain, Stokes embraced it too. And, 
the Principle of Least Action becomes the fundamental law in Hamilton-
Jacobi theory, a brand of mechanics that takes hold in Germany and much of 
Britain from the 1830s onward. We recognize these two formulations as the 
ancestors of our analytic mechanics. 
Drift.   And so we see how by the mid-1780s mechanics and philosophy 
have grown apart, which brings Descartes’ program to a tragic end of sorts. 
Excessively concerned with certainty for mechanics, the philosophers end up 
with dynamical laws that may be safe from doubt but are explanatorily too 
narrow: they cannot determine by themselves all the possible motions of all 
the possible bodies. Regrettably, philosophers—even great ones, like Kant—
did not seem quite alert to this problem then.  
The theorists, in turn, seem afflicted by a converse problem. Having se-
cured true generality for their laws, they are at a loss about how to show 
their absolute certainty, which they continue to believe in, swayed by phi-
losophy. They either state it blankly, like Euler in the Letters, who asserts 
without proof that the Principle of Least Action is “perfectly founded in the 
nature of body, and those who deny it are very much in the wrong” (1802: 
303). Or they proffer basic dynamical principles while bracketing entirely 
the question of evidential support for them, as Euler does with his two laws 
in his late papers. Or, finally, they flail about ineffectually as they try to de-
rive these basic laws from deeper, supposedly more certain premises. Such is 
the case of Lagrange and a host of others, ca. 1780-1825. Having left Berlin 
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for Paris, he and his new confrères at the Ecole Polytechnique spend decades 
seeking in vain to ground the Principle of Virtual Work, our statement [2] 
above, in something absolutely certain or self-evident (Bailhache 1975). Af-
ter Fourier they give up in frustration, and the question becomes dormant. 
But it just makes the split more painfully obvious to those who care to look.      
 
Kinematic foundations 
Lastly, there were interjections on whether motion is ‘relative’ or there are 
‘absolute’ motions. However, these terms are highly misleading and laden 
with anachronistic connotations. It is best to present this debate from within.  
Early modern mechanics presupposed an (often implicit) distinction be-
tween true and apparent motion. For instance, if taken to be about apparent 
motions and rest, both Copernicanism and the Law of Inertia are trivially 
false.29 So, it was assumed, the dynamical laws are statements about the true 
motions of bodies. Inevitably, a metaphysical question arises now: what is 
the nature of true motion? What does motus in re vera (as Descartes called it) 
consist in? Newton notoriously claimed that true motion is absolute motion. 
That is, it consists in velocity in absolute space, a rigid immobile frame met-
aphysically distinct from bodies. His opponents retorted that true motion is 
relational. Namely, it consists in a distinguished relation of matter to matter, 
not to space itself.30   
Newton did not just declare that true motion was absolute, but he also 
gave a very powerful argument that it must be so.31 Briefly, its logic was as 
follows. (i) Bodies have true motions: for any given body, there is a fact of 
the matter as to whether it really moves or rests. (ii) True motion is either 
absolute or “relative,” i.e. relational; tertium non datur. (iii) Any correct ac-
count of true motion must satisfy the “properties, causes, and effects” of true 
                                                     
29 The Earth indisputably appears to rest and the Sun to move. Given an initial impulse, a ball 
rolling on a smooth, long, flat table will describe a curve—a cycloid—not as straight line, as 
the Law of Inertia predicts. (This is evidently because the table, and the Earth to which it is 
fastened, is a rotating frame, hence is not inertial.)   
30 A third, small group—the later Huygens, the young Leibniz—asserted that motion was 
relativistic. I.e., they denied that bodies have any true motions. Confusingly, they phrased this 
as a claim that motion is ‘relative.’ Thus, interpreters must use extreme caution with the term 
‘relative motion.’ It was a linguistic vehicle for logically contrary views, viz. relationism and 
relativism. I explain these facts at length in Stan 2015.   
31 Newton’s case for absolute motion is in the Scholium to the Definitions, in his Principia. I 
follow here the reading defended in Rynasiewicz 1995.    
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motion. (iv) Relative motion fails to meet these criteria. (v) Absolute motion 
always meets them. (vi) So, true motion is absolute motion, i.e. velocity in 
absolute space (Newton 1999: 408-12).  
In the century after Newton, the most striking fact is how little under-
stood, and so directly addressed, his argument was. Though Leibniz admit-
ted to Clarke that each body has an “absolute true motion,” he avoided ex-
plaining precisely what it consists in, all the while denying that it is velocity in 
absolute space, as the Newtonians had it. Instead, Leibniz sought to preempt 
their conclusion by arguing that there is no absolute space, hence there can 
be no motion in it. This move ultimately solves nothing; Leibniz still owes 
the world his own account of what true motion is, and a proof that it sup-
ports a mechanics of inertial forces. Still, in Germany the post-Leibnizians 
followed his tactic. Led by Wolff, they rehashed his genetic account of our 
representation <space>. First, they alleged, we perceive direct metric rela-
tions between material objects. Then, by “abstraction,” we form the concept 
of a system of situations for the class of all actual bodies: space (Wolff 1730: 
455-61). Motion, in turn, is nothing but a body’s change of situation relative 
to some set of bodies (1730: 493ff.). Possibly true, but insufficient. At any 
instant, a given body changes infinitely many kinematic relations to others. 
And yet, both the new mechanics and his natural philosophy assume that 
bodies have unique true motions, which he ought to define and defend. Re-
grettably, Wolff always remained oblivious to this deep, difficult problem. 
So did his disciple, Thümmig, who went on to write a useless, repetitive 
“sixth letter to Clarke” after Leibniz’s death, without ever grasping that true 
motion all but inexorably requires absolute space (Sharpe 1744).   
Against this background of general obliviousness to Newton’s point, Eu-
ler in 1748 made a strong kinematico-dynamical case for absolute space, 
with his Réfléctions sur l’espace et le tems.32 Here is a capsule. (i) True motion 
and rest obey the Law of Inertia: only external forces can change a body’s 
true uniform translation or rest; and they always change them if applied to it. 
(ii) ‘Relative’ motion does not satisfy the Law. That motion can be changed 
without applying a force to the body; and a net force can fail to change it. (iii) 
In contrast, motion in absolute space cannot but obey the Law. Therefore 
true motion, i.e. change of true place,  
                                                     
32 For context, elaboration, and immediate reception of Euler’s case, cf. Stan 2012.   
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“is governed by the idea of place as conceived of in Mathematics, and not at all 
by the body’s relation to other bodies. Now, one cannot say that [the Law of In-
ertia] rests on something that subsists only in our imagination. Hence, we must 
absolutely conclude that the mathematical idea of place is not imaginary, but 
that there exists something real that corresponds to this idea. Therefore in the 
world, beyond the objects that constitute it, there is some reality that we repre-
sent by the idea of place.” (Euler 1750: §13).   
 
In essence, this is the very same logic as Newton’s. Recall Newton’s premise 
(iii) above: true motion has certain “properties, causes, and effects.” The 
causes are “forces impressed upon bodies to generate motion” (1999: 412). 
Now, the Law of Inertia governs these forces: they alone change true inertial 
translation; and they always change it. But, to change a body’s relative mo-
tion, forces are neither necessary nor sufficient, in flat contradiction with the 
Law. Thus, Newton and Euler concluded separately, true motion cannot 
consist in a relation of matter to matter. This raises a fascinating question, as 
yet unsolved. Did Euler in Réfléctions just restate a part of Newton’s argu-
ment without acknowledging him as the originator? Or did he rediscover it 
independently? His powerful intellect and peerless grasp of the conceptual 
foundations of mechanics certainly point to the latter.               
As Euler was for absolute motion at that time—its sole yet ablest de-
fender—so was Kant for relationism. He first advocated it in New Theory of 
Motion and Rest, a little-read but very important paper from 1758. Recall that 
a relationist grants that any body has a unique true motion, and explicates it 
as a distinguished relation to other bodies or matter. Kant is no exception. 
For him, wahrhafte Bewegung is the kinematic relation between any two inter-
acting bodies. (In keeping with the Wolffians’ paradigm process, Kant in the 
1750s restricts his account to collision.) Again like any standard relationist, 
he explains why that relation is privileged: in his view, because it results in 
dynamical effects, unlike any other kinematic change relative to bodies out-
side the interacting system. Further, the two colliding bodies share in this 
mutual relation—viz., relative motion—to the same extent: “tell me if one 
can infer, from what happens between them, that one is at rest and only the 
second moves, and also which of them rests or moves. Must we not ascribe 
the motion to both, namely in equal measure? Their mutual approach may 
be attributed to the one just as much as to the other” (2:18). So, he infers, in 
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any impact one body is in true motion relative to the other, and vice versa. 
Quantitatively, this motion is its momentum with respect to the mass center 
of the 2-body system. Thus each body has a true velocity, which consists in 
a relation to a material system of reference, the so-called center-of-mass 
(CM) frame of the collision.  
What is more, Kant keeps this version of relationism into the 1780s, 
modulo his switch to transcendental idealism. In Foundations, he reasserts his 
early relationist credo: “all motion is relative only…. That is, matter can be 
thought as moved or at rest solely in relation to matter, and never with re-
spect to mere space without matter” (4:559). However, a body has (infinite-
ly) many such relations to ‘matters’ outside it. Which is its true motion? Kant 
explains, true motion is an “active relation of matters in space” (4:545). A 
‘matter’ is in that relation if it interacts with another by exerting a “moving 
force.” His paradigm is again direct collision, for which he argues that each 
body has a true velocity relative to the CM-frame. (In this case, its ‘moving 
force’ is linear momentum, or capacity to accelerate objects in its path.) 
Then he claims without really explaining that his analysis applies to interac-
tions by attractive forces as well, e.g. gravitation.33 And, in a novel develop-
ment, he extends his relationism to circular motion—specifically, to a spin-
ning body. Allegedly, that too is relative motion, because any two “opposite 
parts” in the body—diametrically across, normal to the axis of rotation—
endeavor to recede from each other (4:561f.). Thus Kant convinces himself that 
all true motion is a relation of matter to matter, and so there is no need for 
Newton’s absolute space as the fundamental frame of reference.34  
Kant could not have known it, but his key insight rediscovered an idea 
the young Leibniz had, but left fallow. Around 1677, Leibniz too had sur-
mised that true motion is a mutual relation between colliding bodies, such 
that each has a true momentum relative to their CM-frame:  
 
If space is a certain thing consisting in a supposed pure extension… and motion is 
change of space, then motion will be something absolute. But in reality… motion 
is not something absolute, but consists in relation. And therefore if two bodies 
                                                     
33 Friedman (2013: 494ff.) is a reconstruction of Kant’s reasoning for this sort of process. 
34 This account is based on results obtained in Stan 2009 and 2015. There is an alternative 
reading, on which Kantian true motion is motion relative to an inertial frame designated by 
matter. (Ultimately, the global CM-frame of the physical universe.) Friedman 1992 and 2013 
has defended it with great sophistication.  
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collide, the speed must be understood to be distributed between them in such a way 
that each runs into the other with the same force. Thus… all the phenomena con-
sistent with experiments will be at once deduced from this fact alone.  (Leibniz 
2001: 225; A.iv.359; my italics) 
 
Combine this with the fact that Kant’s relationism was originally an en-
gagement with Wolff’s foundations of mechanics, not with Newton or Euler 
(Stan 2011). Then it turns out that, in this period, there is a strong Leibnizi-
an strand in kinematic foundations too, not just in mater theory or dynamical 
principles, as I have explained.  
 
Conclusions 
Natural philosophy in post-Leibnizian Prussia is a greatly diverse milieu, 
rich in seminal developments that shaped mechanics and its philosophy into 
the late modernity. Notably, Newtonianism—in both theory construction 
and conceptual foundations—long remains a minor presence. And, when it 
becomes established it never gains full supremacy. Strong Leibnizian ele-
ments always remain in place to challenge its rule, as do other, novel me-
chanical ideas and constructions genuinely born out of the Age of Reason, 
not grown from early modern seeds.  
At the same time, this diversity of foundational perspectives defies any 
attempt to show that post-Newtonian mechanics is a unified theory. Three, 
mutually irreconcilable ontologies are offered as material basis for its models. 
The epistemic status and identity of basic dynamical laws become split be-
yond easy reconciliation. And, the 17th-century schism between absolutists 
and relationists about motion remains in place. Together, these disagree-
ments should give us an edifying glimpse into the discord that reigned in 
much of 19th-century mechanical foundations.  
Hopefully this preview is enough to inspire us to give Enlightenment 
natural philosophy in Germany the attention and respect it deserves.   
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